Just another day on the frequency? Maybe not.
I came across an interesting video on VASAviation’s YouTube channel. The encounter involves Newark Approach, and the pilots in control of a NetJets Cessna Citation Latitude (EJA636 – Execjet 636) aircraft flying into Teterboro Airport.
The video starts off with the Newark Approach air traffic controller clearing the pilots to descend via the RNAV approach for runway 24. You can watch the video, but I’ll still include the text for those who prefer to read the interaction.
EWR Approach: “Execjet 636, you’re 8 miles from STRAD, STRAD at 3,000, cleared RNAV 24.”
Execjet 636: “STRAT [inaudible] RNAV 24, Execjet 636.”
A Flexjet aircraft checks in on frequency (LXJ562), accidentally saying “Flexjet 566” rather than 562, while informing ATC they were at 4,000 feet. The controller addresses them by the correct callsign, and they repeat their altitude with the corrected callsign.
EWR Approach: “Execjet 636, everything okay?”
Execjet 636: “Yes, sir.”
EWR Approach: “Because I gave you STRAD at 3,000. STRAD is 5 miles behind you, and you’re still at 4,000.”
Execjet 636: “Execjet 636, we’re going to 3,000 now.”
Execjet 636: “We heard at or above 3,000 at STRAD clear the approach.”
EWR Approach: “Say again?”
Execjet 636: “Execjet 636, We heard at or above 3,000, cleared for the [departure?] STRAD.”
EWR Approach: “It’s okay. Just, at least, when you get to WHEZY, make sure you’re at 2 there, alright?”
Execjet 636: “WHEZY at 2, Execjet 636.”
Another NetJets aircraft with a similar callsign (Execjet 633) also checks in with their altitude.
EWR Approach: “Execjet 636.”
Execjet 636: “Yes, sir.”
EWR Approach: “I thought we agreed that you were gonna cross WHEZY at 2, so this is the second clearance that you’re not abiding.”
Execjet 636: “Execjet 636, roger.”
EWR Approach: “No, roger isn’t the answer. I want to know why you’re not complying with the clearances that I’m giving you. Are you separating yourself from other IFR traffic?”
Execjet 636: [Inaudible]
EWR Approach: “Would you like to continue VFR or, I mean, I’m just confused why I keep asking you to do something and you’re not doing what I’m telling you.”
Execjet 636: “Sir, we’re descending to 2,000 to WHEZY now, sorry.”
EWR Approach: “Read it back.”
Execjet 636: “Yes, sir.”
Flexjet 562 is then instructed to turn heading 080.
Execjet 636: “What’s the heading again for Execjet 686, err 636?”
EWR Approach: 633, just your current heading. Maintain 3,000.
Execjet 636: “Execjet 636, we’re going left turn to 080, correct?”
EWR Approach: “No, no, no. You’re on the approach. Execjet 636, you’re supposed to be at 2,000, you’re cleared the approach. You’re already not doing anything that I told you to do and you’re not descending, I’m just confused, do you want to continue going to Teterboro or what would you like to do?”
Execjet 636: “Descending now for Teterboro, Execjet 636, sorry.”
When the NetJets pilots started their final approach, the controller gave them a phone number to call for a “definite” pilot deviation.
The pilot was clearly behind on a lot of things
Most commenters were quick to call out the pilots who were obviously well behind their aircraft and not paying attention. They missed the 3,000 feet altitude ATC-given restriction at STRAD, and later claimed they thought they heard “3,000 feet or above”.
They then crossed WHEZY at 3,000 feet even though the controller wanted them crossing the waypoint at 2,000 feet. It sounds to me as if the pilots were being too overly reliant on the aircraft’s calculated altitudes rather than programming in their given restrictions and monitoring the changes.
With two other similar-sounding callsigns in the airspace, the NetJets pilots were clearly confused as they asked about turning to heading 080 even when they were already cleared for the approach. That instruction was actually given to the pilots of Flexjet 562.
The approach controller didn’t help the situation either
For starters, the controller should have alerted the pilots of NetJets (Execjet) 636 and 633, and Flexjet 562 of similar sounding callsigns and flight numbers. This would have kept the pilots on alert. Even the controller themselves were confused at one point, thinking that Execjet 633 called in when it was actually Execjet 636.
With regard to the altitude restrictions, the approach only specifies the minimum descent altitude between each respective waypoint. This is important because the onus is now put on the controller to determine what altitude they want aircraft to be at during the approach phase.
In this scenario, the controller cleared them to cross STRAD at 3,000 feet. After realizing they missed that restriction, they did not properly re-clear them to cross WHEZY at 2,000 feet. The controller said ” when you get to WHEZY, make sure you’re at 2 there” rather than saying something like “cross WHEZY at 2,000 feet”.
The approach chart only specifies that aircraft should be no lower than 2,000 feet at WHEZY, so the aircraft’s vertical navigation guidance may have calculated something higher.
Finally, the controller spent quite a bit of time berating the pilot on frequency rather than trying to give clearer and firm instructions. Asking them to copy down a phone number on final also seemed inappropriate especially in this case where the pilots were already struggling to keep up.
So what’s what?
The pilots clearly lacked situational awareness, and it seems the aircraft was flying the pilots rather than the other way around. If they were following the given instructions, this would be just another day at Teterboro.
However the controller’s deviation from standard phraseology, and other factors such as the two other similar callsigns did not help the situation either. Rather than airing out their frustration on the frequency, they could have been concise and firm to get the NetJets pilots back on track, leaving the excessive complaining for the phone call.
Featured image: Quintin Soloviev/Wikime | CC BY-SA 4.0 International
